Deception as Strategy: From the Empty Fort to the Hundred-Year Marathon
Have you ever discovered, years later, that you had read someone completely wrong?
It could be your best friend or your spouse — someone you thought would watch your back no matter what — betraying you at the most unexpected moment.
You were startled and immediately regretted that you trusted the wrong person, wondering why you had been so naïve as to miss all the early signs. But have you ever considered that perhaps it was not because you lacked information, but because you were led into the wrong frame?
If you recall again, you might realize that back then you were shown a believable, coherent story, and were also warned that this story should not be shared with anyone else — perhaps to surprise your family later, or to prevent you from being put in an uncomfortable situation. In other words, you were never given a chance to fact-check the story. Until one day, in one way or another, the truth revealed itself.
In modern times, we call these frauds or scams. They all operate under one principle: deception.
The key to deception is to create a believable narrative that makes you act or react in the way the initiator desires. This is one of the oldest and most strategic tools applied in human history.
Zhuge Liang and the Empty Fort Strategy
The Empty Fort Strategy is one of the most famous psychological gambits from the Chinese classic The Romance of the Three Kingdoms.
(The Three Kingdoms refer to Wei — the largest state with the strongest bureaucracy and logistics; Shu — the smallest state, with limited manpower and heavy reliance on elite leadership; and Wu — a regional power with strong defensive and naval advantages.)
In 228 AD, during Shu’s first Northern Expedition, the strategist Zhuge Liang suffered a critical setback when the strategic pass of Jieting was lost. With his main army away, Zhuge Liang was left vulnerable in the small city of Xicheng with only about 2,500 soldiers. Suddenly, the Wei commander Sima Yi arrived with an overwhelming force of around 150,000 troops.
Knowing retreat was impossible, Zhuge Liang ordered the city gates opened and the streets swept by soldiers disguised as civilians. He then sat atop the city gate, calmly playing a zither (guqin), with two young boys by his side.
Sima Yi, a cautious and brilliant strategist himself, suspected a massive ambush. He believed that a resourceful strategist such as Zhuge Liang — known for his prudence — would never leave a city undefended unless it was a trap. Fearing a hidden army, Sima Yi ordered a full retreat.
Zhuge Liang used this psychological leverage to turn a certain defeat into a legendary victory without firing a single arrow.
This Empty Fort Strategy became a legend — taught to every Chinese child in school. Not because there was verbal concealment or military deployment, but because there was none. Just acting — based on his understanding of Sima Yi’s personality — Zhuge Liang conducted one of the most famous cognitive manipulations in Chinese history.
Zhuge Liang did not win by sheer luck. He made Sima Yi believe that the city’s “business as usual” was a trap. He did not pretend that he had an ambush force ready; he was betting on how Sima Yi would interpret “business as usual.” Under normal circumstances, no fortress would leave its gates wide open when anticipating an enemy invasion. This abnormality, combined with Zhuge Liang’s reputation for prudence and foresight, led Sima Yi to make the wrong interpretation.
This was, perhaps, the ultimate form of deception.
In The Art of War, it has been stated repeatedly that all warfare is based on deception.
Time and Deception Beyond Warfare
Other than military applications, deception is often applied by individuals.
A Tang dynasty poet warned more than a thousand years ago that no test reveals truth instantly — not jade, not timber, and certainly not people. This idea appears in a frequently quoted poem:
I give you a single rule to dispel all doubt:
No need to divine by tortoise shell or milfoil stalks.
To test jade, one must burn it for three full days;
To judge timber, one must wait seven years.
The Duke of Zhou once trembled under slander;
Wang Mang appeared humble before he seized the throne.
Had they died at the moment they were first seen,
Who could have known, through a lifetime, what was true or false?
「贈君一法決狐疑，不用鑽龜與祝蓍。 試玉要燒三日滿，辨材須待七年期。 周公恐懼流言日，王莽謙恭末篡時。 向使當初身便死，一生真偽復誰知？」(白居易 · 放言五首 · 其三)
The poet was trying to say that it takes time to read a person, and that it is difficult to see a person’s true nature.
The examples are telling. The Duke of Zhou was falsely accused of plotting to seize the throne and resigned in fear of rumor. Wang Mang, by contrast, was widely praised as generous and virtuous — until he poisoned the emperor and crowned himself ruler.
“Had they died at the moment they were first seen…” is the perfect illustration of deception. The virtuous may be slandered; the treacherous may appear humble. Only time can differentiate falsehood from truth, as behaviors can be organized and purposeful, and public opinion can be the result of calculated manipulation.
Xi Jinping as a Modern Example
Another, more recent example is Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2012, and President of China since 2013.
Xi missed formal education during the Cultural Revolution and spent years performing physical labor in the countryside. After the Cultural Revolution ended, he entered university through the “recommendation system,” a path often viewed with skepticism by those admitted through competitive entrance exams.
During his early career, Xi Jinping was described as hardworking and down-to-earth. In 1982, during his first job in Baoding County of Hebei Province, Xi reportedly familiarized himself with every part of the area on foot, making a strong impression on his supervisors. Several peers described him as “approachable, gentle in manner, cultivated, and personable.”
This “approachable and gentle” image — at least as perceived by Communist Party elders such as former President Jiang Zemin — helped Xi secure the position of General Secretary. Party elders believed he was less ambitious and easier to manage than Li Keqiang, who held a doctorate and was regarded as a capable economist.
Looking back, from 1982 to 2012, Xi spent thirty years portraying himself as a moderate technocrat with a courteous and pragmatic demeanor.
He did not appear as ambitious as Bo Xilai, nor as capable as Li Keqiang. He did not stand out among those rising political stars, but this created a perfect opportunity. In the eyes of power-conscious Party elders, this became a valuable asset.
A Surprise in the Military
If you were used to the Xi Jinping before 2012, you would be very surprised to see the Xi Jinping after he became the commander in chief of China, particularly after 2022.
Followers of China news are probably no longer surprised by the speed at which Xi purged his military leaders.
The current 20th Central Military Commission (CMC) was officially nominated and “elected” during the 20th CCP National Congress and the subsequent First Plenary Session (1st Plenum) in October 2022. There were seven members initially (see the table below).
In February 2024, Li Shangfu was removed. Later, Xi’s allies He Weidong and Miao Hua were placed under investigation and subsequently removed from the CMC.
Particularly after October 2025, Xi appeared to have lost control of the CMC and the Party.
He then emphasized “collective leadership” and stability, to make Party elders believe that he would follow their lead, and that Zhang Youxia, the veteran career soldier, would attend to all military affairs.
But just when the Party elders and Zhang thought everything was under control, in January 2026, Xi made his strike with lightning speed and precision — he was reported to have taken action against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, with condemnations appearing within days through state-linked media channels.
Xi removed his opponents as planned. He pretended to be cooperative and low-key, made his opponents believe he would obey, then took the chance to fight back, like a predator devouring its prey.
As of October 31, 2026, only two remain among the seven original members of the CMC: Xi himself, and Zhang Shengmin, who was promoted to vice chairman from member only months ago, in October 2025.
According to the missing South China Morning Post investigative reporter Chan Man-li, both Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin had been under secret investigation since 2023. Just imagine — if Zhang Shengmin is also removed, then Xi would be the last person at the table, and hold near-absolute power.
(Note: Chan Man-li disappeared while reporting in Beijing; her whereabouts remain unknown at the time of writing.)
Patience is essential to perfect deception.
Perhaps this was actually a much easier play — considering that Xi spent 30 years portraying the “approachable and gentle” persona in his earlier career, the past few months’ performance to disguise his intention would have been a much simpler task.
The Hundred-Year Marathon
At the macro level, deception is considered a powerful strategy in geopolitical play.
In American foreign policy strategist and government official Michael Pillsbury’s book The Hundred-Year Marathon, China is described as deploying a “secret strategy to replace America as the global superpower.”
Pillsbury’s Hundred-Year Marathon reference is derived from China’s “Two One-Hundred-Year Goals,” set out by then President of China Jiang Zemin in 1997, during the 15th CCP National Congress:
· By 2021 — on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese government aimed “to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects,” with an emphasis on targeted poverty reduction and alleviation measures (achieved, as per government announcement).
· By 2049 — the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government aims “to build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious.”
Pillsbury argues that China’s marathon strategy depends heavily on goodwill from other countries, especially the United States. This goodwill materialized in massive foreign direct and indirect investment, as well as tolerance of China’s problematic issues year after year, such as the theft of technological secrets, violations of WTO guidelines, and breaches of human rights norms.
Furthermore, Pillsbury observed that China’s modern military and overall planning strategies are greatly influenced by lessons learned from the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period (春秋戰國時期), which lasted over 500 years, and that Stratagems of the Warring States 《戰國策》 is closely studied by planners and decision-makers.
Pillsbury stated that, in order to achieve its 2049 goal, China has been applying a grand strategy with nine principal elements:
1. Induce complacency to avoid alerting your opponents;
2. Manipulate your opponent’s advisers;
3. Be patient;
4. Steal your opponent’s ideas and technology for strategic purposes;
5. Military might is not the critical factor for winning a long-term competition;
6. Recognize that the hegemon will take extreme, even reckless actions to retain its dominant position;
7. Never lose sight of shi (勢);
8. Establish and employ metrics for measuring your status relative to other potential challengers;
9. Always be vigilant to avoid being encircled or deceived by others.
Ultimately, Pillsbury believes China is carefully concealing its ambition to become a global superpower and is using all possible measures to keep its competitors off guard, even inducing them to assist China.
In Pillsbury’s lens, China is running a Hundred-Year Marathon with clear intent and consistent implementation tactics. As a result, Pillsbury argues, China’s posture of courtesy is often misread as alignment, silence as lack of intent, and engagement as full cooperation.
Conclusion
Whether it’s a country or an individual, it takes at least two parties to complete the deception act. When deception succeeds, the victim does not feel fooled. They feel rational.
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